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It is a great pleasure to be back here at Columbia, where I once taught at 
the Business School. I've had many rewarding professional experiences over 
the years — in the military, in the government, and on Wall Street — but 
without any doubt my time at this university was among the highlights. 
I owe my association with Columbia to Professor Hugh Patrick, who 
directs the Center on Japanese Economy and Business, which is sponsoring this 
conference. In 1991, Hugh was kind enough to ask me to preview my 
upcoming book, A Cold Peace: America. Japan. Germany and the Struggle 
for Supremacy, before a group of Business School students. After the 
presentation, he, Professor David Biem, a few students and I went out to 
dinner. Hugh and David both asked me if I ever thought about teaching. The 
rest is history, and I'm greatly indebted to both of them for having gotten me 
involved. 
When I was at the Business School, my comparative advantage, I think, 
was in bringing real world experiences to the classroom. I taught my courses 
in international finance and trade entirely through case studies, many of which I 
had once participated in. Whenever I told old war stories it was like an electric 
bolt hit the class, so great was the appetite among the students for "how it 
actually works." But for me the big challenge was putting the real world into 
the broader context, to extract the lessons, good and bad, that made any 
particular case more significant than the events themselves. In this respect the 
best thing about teaching here was that I was forced to think as hard as my 
students. 
Today I want to try to apply the same thought process to American 
relations with Japan. I will start with a review of the Clinton Administration's 
policies over these past two years. Then I'll turn to the agenda for the next 
two. But most importantly, I would like to draw back and reflect on the overall 
strategic context of our relations for the remainder of this decade, and to point 
to some of the lessons we have learned and the broader challenges which we 
now face. 
My bottom line is that we will need a much more strategic approach to 
Japan. First, we will have to figure out not only how to negotiate contentious 
issues but how we can align ourselves with the forces of change in our number 
one Asian ally. Second, we will need to go beyond our decade-old obsession 
with Japan as an economic superpower posing unique challenges and integrate 
our policies toward Japan into the broader Asian context in which our interests 
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over. The socioeconomic model which allowed the nation to favor producers 
over consumers is tarnished and is slowly eroding. The high yen will continue 
to cause major dislocation in parts of Japan's industry. 
But this is only half the story. The high yen is also forcing Japanese 
firms to cut costs and hone production techniques to remain competitive. 
Under this pressure, we will see in the next few years Japanese products which 
are of higher sophistication and quality. We will see a workforce in Japan 
which is more flexible and skilled. If, as is always possible in a world of 
fluctuating exchange rates, the yen depreciates significantly against the dollar, 
we will face renewed export surges. 
In short, we should not underestimate or overestimate the challenge, but 
it would be dangerous and irresponsible to be complacent. 
As I will discuss later, moreover, we can no longer think of Japan as so 
totally distinct from the rest of Asia. Japan now trades more with its Asian 
neighbors that it does with us. Its production systems are increasingly 
integrated with the rest of Asia. Its influence in world affairs is closely tied 
with its identification with broader Asian interests. In this most dynamic region 
of the world we need to cooperate closely with Japan, even while it is our 
fiercest competitor. 
Despite this mutual importance and interdependence, our economic 
relationship with Japan remains uneven and unbalanced. Japan enjoys 
essentially unfettered access to the U.S. market. Yet too many U.S. firms, and 
those from other countries for that matter, continue to face intractable barriers 
when they try to export to Japan - notwithstanding Japan's status as one of the 
biggest markets and richest countries in the world. These difficulties are 
evident in the big bilateral trade and investment imbalances that successive 
Administrations have been pointing to for well over a decade, as well as 
Japan's rising trade surpluses with the rest of the world. 
The impact of Japan's protectionism on the U.S. is substantial. 
According to a number of studies, if Japan were to eliminate all its barriers to 
trade, U.S. exports to Japan would increase somewhere in the range of $9.0 
and $18.0 billion each year. In terms of the overall current account balance, 
this may not sound dramatic. But, assuming that $1 billion in U.S. exports 
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umbrella which allows us to address not only industry-specific barriers, but also 
the underlying macroeconomic and structural obstacles confronting U.S. 
companies when they try to do business in Japan. 
At the outset, the Administration made it clear that the Framework would 
be different from previous Administrations' initiatives. Specifically, we wanted 
to obtain measurable gains in access to Japan's market. When the Framework 
was launched, Japan agreed to promote a "significant increase" in global 
imports of goods and services, including those from the United States. The 
idea was that we wanted not just to negotiate the removal of trade barriers, but 
also to see concrete, measurable results in the marketplace. In addition, 
President Clinton and then-Prime Minister Miyazawa agreed that Summit 
meetings would take place twice a year to monitor the progress achieved in the 
opening of Japan's market, as well as to discuss macroeconomic developments. 
These meetings would shine the most politically intense light on the negotiations 
that we could think of. 
Let me begin with the macroeconomic dimension. By tackling underlying 
macroeconomic problems, we hope to foster an economic environment in Japan 
that encourages consumption and domestic demand and leads to an economy 
that is more open and receptive to imports. Accordingly, as part of the 
Framework, Japan promised to actively pursue strong and sustainable domestic 
demand-led growth, a highly significant decrease in its current account surplus, 
and a significant increase in global imports of goods and services. 
Since the Framework was launched, Japan has made some progress in its 
efforts to stimulate domestic demand. For example, Japan recently announced 
a 10-year, 630 trillion yen stimulus package to get the economy going. In 
addition, it is implementing a 5.5 trillion yen income tax cut in Japan fiscal 
years 1995 and 1996, and 3.5 trillion yen thereafter. It is worth noting, 
however, that, after three years, the consumption tax will be raised to partially 
offset the loss of revenue caused by the income tax cut. We welcome these 
stimulative measures and hope that Japan will take whatever additional steps are 
necessary to build on this progress and ensure that the economic recovery is 
firmly in place. 
In addition, we have reached five specific agreements so far under the 
Framework. 
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Japan also agreed to rely, as much as possible, on international procurement 
standards and to reduce the number of sole-source contracts that favor Japanese 
firms. Very importantly, the agreement also includes qualitative and 
quantitative criteria to evaluate progress, along the same lines that I described 
for medical technology procurement. 
Under the second accord, NTT agreed to improvements in its 
procurement process similar to those agreed to by the Japanese government. 
As a result, U.S. companies can expect better, more timely information on 
NTT's procurement process, multiple opportunities to shape requests for 
proposals before they are issued, and technical specifications that will not 
exclude them. 
Insurance. Japan agreed to enhance the transparency of its insurance 
regulations, to introduce specific reforms, and to strengthen antitrust 
enforcement. Specifically, it will put administrative guidance in writing and 
publish standards for the approval of licenses and new products. Tokyo also 
will introduce a system for large commercial insurance in which companies will 
be allowed to introduce products by "notifying" regulators instead of going 
through the cumbersome prior approval process - thereby easing the hold of its 
regulatory officials. Japan also says it will strictly enforce the Antimonopoly 
Act against unfair trade practices and study keiretsu business practices in its 
insurance sector. The agreement also includes qualitative and quantitative 
criteria to measure progress. 
Other Accomplishments 
We have also had some major accomplishments outside of the 
Framework. These include: 
Construction. In January 1994, under pressure from the United States to 
open its construction market, and in response to Japanese domestic pressure to 
reform its scandal-ridden procurement system, Japan announced an action plan 
to reform its public sector construction market. This plan, coupled with 
additional understandings reached in an exchange of letters between Commerce 
Secretary Brown and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, will 
significantly increase business opportunities for foreign firms in Japan's public 
construction market, where 1993 contracts exceeded $300 billion. Tokyo 
agreed to use an open and competitive bidding system instead of the closed 
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Evaluation 
How to assess what has happened so far? No one could say that we 
achieved everything we wanted. But given the historical difficulties of 
negotiating with Japan, the Administration's record is good - especially, as I 
mentioned before, in light of recession and constant political changes in Japan. 
Nevertheless, the trade balance has continued to deteriorate. This, I would say, 
is a result of several factors. First, there has been rapid growth in the U.S. 
which sucks in imports, combined with slow growth in Japan which has the 
opposite effect. Second, Japanese trade barriers have been very slow to fall. 
Third, for a variety of reasons - sky-high costs, subtle barriers, lack of 
effort - American firms have not been investing enough in setting up shop in 
Japan. Such investment, were it to occur, would have a "pull effect" on the 
sale of U.S. components from U.S. parent companies to their Japanese 
affiliates. 
In addition to the disappointing trade figures, there is a growing fatigue 
and weariness among the negotiations on both sides of the Pacific which makes 
the future agenda more difficult. 
THE NEXT TWO YEARS 
We have a significant agenda for the next two years. We plan to 
continue discussions with Japan on macroeconomic policy. We plan to continue 
pressing for more open markets for U.S. exporters. We will broaden the scope 
of the Framework to emphasize such issues as investment and deregulation. 
And we will step up our export promotion efforts to assist specific U.S. 
companies to sell into the Japanese market. 
Unfinished Business 
To begin with, we have some unfinished business to wrap up. 
Automotive trade is one of our top priorities ~ both autos and auto parts. 
Roughly 60 percent of the bilateral deficit is in autos and parts, and, frankly, 
we have little to show for our efforts over the past 18 months. In fact, our 
automotive deficits are rising. 
Our attempts to solve this problem focus on three areas: the sale of 
original equipment parts to Japanese companies in Japan as well as in the U.S.; 
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In the context of our Framework discussions with Japan, the U.S. is 
encouraging Japan to adopt a broad set of principles to guide its deregulation 
efforts over the next five years. To facilitate this process, we recently tabled 
an extensive list of specific suggestions for deregulation across a wide range of 
sectors. 
More than just helping U.S. firms, deregulation would also help Japanese 
citizens. All segments of Japanese society — from the consumer to the small 
shopowner to the largest corporations — are entangled in a web of excess 
regulation. Over ten thousand regulations are in place, many of which serve no 
useful purpose. Some discriminate against foreign firms while others affect all 
firms equally. The bottom line, however, is that these regulations are 
unreasonable burdens to commerce and removing them would be better for 
everyone. 
Monitoring Progress and Compliance 
Even after various agreements are reached, however, our work is not 
finished -- we still need to aggressively monitor them for effective 
implementation. Indeed, an essential component of all agreements is to include 
follow-up monitoring mechanisms. 
This monitoring mechanism generally involves regular bilateral meetings 
to discuss progress made or problems that may have been encountered in 
implementing agreements. These meetings are critical in raising issues at the 
earliest possible stages, as well as in keeping up a good working dialogue with 
our Japanese counterparts. They can be formal or informal. On the formal 
side, to take an example, we will be meeting with Japan's Ministry of Health 
and Welfare later this month to discuss progress in implementing the 
medical/pharmaceutical Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) agreement, 
concluded several years ago. We also will hold an informal meeting with the 
Construction Ministry to discuss our recently reached construction agreement. 
Let me stress that we take the monitoring process very seriously, and we 
devote considerable resources to it. After all, it doesn't matter how good a 
trade agreement may be if it is not properly implemented. 
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services, and information services. Both MITI and the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications have issued "vision papers" which emphasize the creation 
of a vast Japanese information infrastructure. Along these lines, we are 
working with our MITI counterparts to acquire information on developments in 
this sector. I have been in contact with industry and government experts in the 
U.S. and Japan, and I'm sure this market has the potential to be enormous. 
We are trying to break new ground in our approach to promoting U.S. 
sales in this sector. In the past we were asleep at the switch in sectors where 
we were ahead but where Japanese firms were gathering momentum. Then, 
when we woke up, we found that the Japanese had caught up with us, 
penetrated our market, and shut us out of theirs. With information technology 
we want to try to preempt problems. We are gearing up to say something like 
this to our Japanese friends: 
"It's true that the U.S. is years ahead of you in most areas of information 
technology. We also know that you plan to spend more than a trillion dollars 
in this decade to catch up. We are watching carefully how you do this. We 
are intent on making sure that you do not follow the models of the past in 
which you follow a Japan-first industrial policy which keeps out foreign firms 
even as you take advantage of their markets, their technology, etc We will 
therefore be expecting that all your policies — intellectual property rights, 
deregulation, government procurement, preferential financing — conform to 
generally accepted international standards, not to Japan in the habits of the past. 
And if not, we will be sounding the alarm everywhere we can, and at the 
earliest possible time. Our objective is to not be unnecessarily contentious; on 
the contrary it is to prevent the trade problems before they become acute." 
Information technology is only one of the sectors that respond to 
fundamental changes in Japanese society. Another target area for us is medical 
equipment, responding to the inevitable ageing of Japanese society. We also 
want to take advantage of the penchant for more leisure activity by promoting 
U.S. entertainment products and services. We know that Japan requires 
massive upgrading of its housing stock; as a result, this should be significant 
opportunities for the U.S. residential construction and building materials 
industry, too. 
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In this regard, I stand by the ideas I described in A Cold Peace -- close 
cooperation among the major countries - including the U.S. and Japan -- is by 
no means assured. The absence of a unified common enemy has reduced the 
urgency of a tight alliance which overshadows differences over economic 
relations. Commercial competition has become much more significant, and less 
susceptible to cooperative management. This is all the more true in an era 
when the industrial nations will be growing slowly, and when the scramble for 
the Big Emerging Markets - the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils -- will be 
downright brutal. 
If we look at the leadership of the West and Japan - at President Clinton, 
Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Muryama, for example — it is easy to 
conclude that they themselves understand the importance of building a global 
economic system in which trade expands, and in which cooperation 
overshadows competition. But the political forces surrounding them present 
each of these leaders with significant challenges. In fact, it is no exaggeration 
to say that in the three most important countries, we are seeing political internal 
upheaval. As a result of the recent Congressional elections here at home, it 
will take a major effort for our two parties to work together to lead the way 
toward a liberal world economy. In Japan, politics have not been so uncertain 
in many decades. Chancellor Kohl just won election by the narrowest of 
margins, and already speculation is rife about the tenure of his administration. 
The point is, in these uncertain times, it will become more difficult than 
it has been in many decades to rise above the temptation to turn inward, and to 
avoid letting our international economic policies drift. All the more reason to 
redouble efforts to open the world economy. All the more reason for the U.S. 
to think through how its economic ties with Japan - our most important 
bilateral relationship — can be improved. 
As I indicated, the Clinton Administration has accomplished quite a lot 
with Japan these past two years. I also think that the agenda we have set for 
1995 - 96 is exactly right, focusing as it does on a handful of critical issues 
including macroeconomics, deregulation, export promotion, and several 
important sectors and structural issues. But there will also be a need to think 
through some broader strategic questions. Here are a few of them: 
17 
deregulation of the market for replacement parts for autos, which also keeps 
prices high, restricts choice, and gives government micro-management 
responsibility. 
It is much easier to talk about aligning ourselves with progressive forces 
in Japan than to do it effectively. What is required is a degree of subtly and 
patience that does not always characterize U.S. policy — in any Administration. 
But there are some things we should be able to do. First, as I mentioned 
before, we should pick negotiation targets which respond to clear consumer 
benefits in Japan. Second, the American Government could sponsor global 
comparative price surveys which underscore how Japanese consumers are being 
taxed by Japan's own policies. 
Beyond this, however, it's time for the U.S. private sector, to do more on 
its own behalf. There's nothing preventing our trade associations from hiring 
Japanese public relations firms from doing high profile market research to bring 
home to Japanese consumers what protection is costing them in various 
industries and products. At a time of reduced budgets, I am certain that the 
onus of aligning with change in Japan should not be just on the U.S. 
Government. To the contrary, American business will have to do much more 
not just as individual companies but as associations. 
What is the right balance between negotiating sectoral issues and 
broader reforms? 
Whenever I get together with friends and colleagues to discuss our 
strategy toward Japan, the issue arises as to whether we should be focusing 
more on macroeconomic issues like growth, or savings and investment patterns, 
or whether the emphasis should be sector specific. The history of successive 
Administration efforts has been that both approaches have been tried - along 
with, I might add, exchange rate issues (Yen - Dollar Accord) - and that the 
verdict is inconclusive. Nothing has prevented the trade balance from 
worsening from the U.S. perspective. Nothing has made Japan a "normal" 
importer, relative to other OECD countries. My own view is simple: we need 
a continuous full-court press on all areas. The issue is not whether the pressure 
should be maintained, but how? Which brings me to some additional 
considerations. 
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Third, we must be careful to explain to other Asian countries why we are 
pressing so hard to get into the Japanese market, and to try to enlist their 
support. As I will show in a minute, we have not done a good job of this. 
But fourth, we cannot let up on Japan, giving it a "sanctuary market" in 
which it is free to exploit everyone else while able to protect its own firms from 
competition. In the long-run we and everyone else will suffer. 
It's a tall order to manage all this right. There is a lot to balance, and 
we are unlikely to achieve all our goals to our and others' satisfaction. But we 
can do much better in the balancing act than we have to date. 
What is the right balance between bilateral and multilateral pressure? 
This brings me to the broader issue of bilateral vs. multilateral 
approaches. I do think we could be more skillful in reinforcing our bilateral 
efforts with both public and behind-the-scenes multilateral diplomacy. 
Remember, Japan agreed to open its rice market under GATT's auspices. This 
commitment was easier to achieve multilaterally than bilaterally because the 
U.S. did not stand alone in demanding liberalization. Indeed, many important 
trading nations vocally supported us. We could be more proactive in urging 
GATT, the IMF, the OECD, APEC, and others to focus on Japanese practices 
that do not conform to world standards. 
The momentum given to APEC to move towards freer trade over the next 
twenty years, and the imminent establishment of the World Trade Organization 
gives the United States a freer start in thinking about multilateral economic 
diplomacy. During the Cold War we devoted enormous energy to multilateral 
political diplomacy in arms negotiations and in the U.N. Security Council. 
This was international politics at its most intense. At times we do this in the 
economic arena, but only episodically - generally at the tail-end of a big 
negotiation like the Uruguay Round. But the time has come to devote more 
effort — much more — to multilateral economics. Pressing Japan through those 
channels will be crucial. 
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wrote en masse created a distorted view of our policies. So, we need to have 
our public relations act together at home, too. 
We also learned a second lesson — that we should be careful not to allow 
our expectations, or those of the public, to rise to unrealistic levels. When it 
comes to negotiations such as the Framework, results are difficult to achieve 
and slow in coming. In addition, there are many major constraints on 
negotiations with Japan. Wall Street has taken a great interest in U.S.-Japan 
trade, and market considerations have become an important factor in what we 
do. Political changes in Japan have been dramatic, and they are not over, with 
the result that big decisions are harder to make in Tokyo than ever before. And 
our ability to take tough trade action - while an option we must preserve and 
use when necessary - is constrained increasingly by a world economy which 
has become so interconnected. 
If unrealistic expectations arise, disappointment when agreements are 
finally reached are inevitable. Concessions will not be seen as compromises, 
but as capitulations. But the very nature of a negotiation is that you must 
compromise. As a result, I think we need to differentiate better between what 
is achievable now and what it achievable five or ten years from now, and adjust 
our private and public expectations accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude with the idea that the single most important aspect of 
our policy toward Japan lies not in trade negotiations, but at home in the United 
States. President Clinton was dead right as a presidential candidate, and he has 
been dead right ever since as President. It is our own economic rejuvenation 
that will do most to improve our competitive position vis-a-vis Japan. If we 
continue to create good jobs; if we redouble efforts in education, and in the 
training of our workforce; if we continue the President's program to invest in 
our technological infrastructure; if we continue to mount an aggressive National 
Export Strategy characterized by closer cooperation between government and 
business and by a relentless focus on the Big Emerging Markets of the future; if 
we continue to reduce the federal budget deficit - if we do all these things, we 
will become more competitive around the world, our standards of living will 
rise, and the "Japan problem" will be far less significant in America's future, 
and far easier to handle. 
